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r e sumen
La actual política de estabilización adoptada por muchos países 
latinoamericanos exige una política monetaria restrictiva aunada a una 
política fiscal conservadora. Aunque estas políticas han sido adaptadas 
para aliviar fragilidades financieras, no han sido capaces de mejorar  
significativamente los niveles de pobreza y desempleo estructurales, lo 
cual hace que el enfoque sea vulnerable a  riesgos políticos. Mediante el 
estudio del caso de Argentina, este trabajo argumenta que la presencia 
de estos  riesgos obliga al gobierno a adoptar un heterodoxo, ecléctico y 
muy flexible sistema de formulación de políticas que puede maximizar 
sus posibilidades de lograr objetivos sociales de largo plazo.
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a b s t r a c t
The current stabilization policy adopted by many Latin American 
countries demands a restrictive monetary policy coupled with a 
conservative fiscal policy.  While these policies have been adapted to suture 
financial fragilities, they have not been able to significantly improve the 
levels of structural poverty and unemployment, rendering the approach 
vulnerable to political risk.  By exploring the case of Argentina, this paper 
argues that the presence of such risk forces the government to adopt a 
heterodox, eclectic and very flexible approach to policy formation that 
may maximize its chances to achieve long term social objectives.
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There is little doubt that emerging economies are vulnerable 
to global economic fluctuations. In the last week of May, 2006, 
rumors doubting the degree of commitment of the then recently 
appointed Chairman of the Federal Reserve System of the United 
States, Ben Bernanke, to keep inflation at bay, as his predecessor 
Alan Greenspan had, coupled with the uncertainty generated by 
the designation of Henry Paulson as the new Treasury Secretary, 
were enough to send a ripple of fear through the channels of the 
global financial system that were felt in stock markets across the 
world.  
In Latin America, analysts were busy trying to explain 
why the repercussions were different among neighbors. Some 
countries experienced a mild shock mitigated by timely monetary 
intervention, while others were less able to cushion the blow. 
For example, while on May 30, 2006, the Dow Jones fell by 
1.63%, Argentina’s index fell by 3.53%, Mexico’s by 3.38%, and 
Brazil’s by 4.54%.1  All and all, however, the impact, compared 
to previous shocks, was mild.  Various analysts argued that most 
countries in Latin America today have been able to accumulate 
enough reserves to absorb mild exogenous changes. They also 
argue that a solid financial position, with twin surpluses, low 
inflation, growing economies and increasing levels of investment 
were, along with capital controls and a healthier debt structure, 
significant factors to protect the real economy when the funds 
began to flow out during the last week of May. However, further 
uncertainty during May and June led to a fall of 18.9% in the 
stock market in Turkey, 14.6% in India, 13.9% in Brazil, 10.7% 
in Mexico, 10% in Argentina and 6.3% in Chile.2 
1  Clarin.com, “Temor en la City: caen la Bolsa y los bonos, y el Central frenó el 
dólar,” May 31, 2006, at www.clarin.com
2  Clarin.com, “El mal clima financiero le costó 1.100 millones de dólares al 
país,” July 13, 2006, at www.clarin.com. 
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Exogenous shocks give rise to financial instability 
which may contribute to derail the development program of a 
government.  And while, according to Schinasi (2004, p. 3-8) 
“…there is no single, widely accepted and used definition of 
financial stability”, he argues that “[a] financial system is in a 
range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating (rather than 
impeding) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating 
financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of 
significant adverse and unanticipated events.”  According to 
Mishkin (1999, p. 6) “…[f]inancial instability occurs when 
shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows 
so that the financial system can no longer do its job of channeling 
funds to those with productive investment opportunities”. But, 
in a broader sense, financial stability implies monetary stability, 
employment levels close to the natural rate, confidence in the 
operation of key institutions and markets, and stable relative 
prices of real and financial assets (Foot, 2003). 
However, exogenous shocks are just one of the problems 
facing emerging economies, where a certain degree of monetary 
and fiscal policy autonomy is needed to address the pervasive and 
often chronic problems of unemployment and poverty.  Hall and 
Taylor (2002) argue that “[d]omestic policy –particularly the scope 
for adjustment to shocks through fiscal, monetary and exchange 
rate polices– can also influence the impact of transmitted shocks. 
For example, active and pre-emptive policy responses appear 
to have had a material impact in reducing spillovers in some 
countries in previous EME crises,” (p. 129).  
Hence, governments that attempt to reduce external 
vulnerability may have to give up certain policy autonomy 
whereby social objectives and financial stability may mutually 
constrain each other within a multi-objective policy set. Shielding 
the economy from external risk may inhibit the attention to 
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domestic social problems, perhaps leading to greater political 
risk arising from social discontent.  
With this problem in mind, this paper studies the case 
of Argentina. Its Central Bank has been implementing an anti-
inflationary policy, while maintaining a devalued currency to 
promote exports and tourism, accumulating foreign reserves, 
sterilizing interventions, restructuring its public debt towards 
longer maturity terms, applying some capital controls and 
developing an anti-cyclical fund. Simultaneously, it has been 
trying to decrease unemployment and poverty, two variables 
upon which much of the program’s credibility depends.  
The main conclusion of this paper is that the political risk 
that may arise from relatively high levels of unemployment and 
poverty must be treated as any other risk factor.  As such, the 
government’s main objective should be to weigh all risk factors 
appropriately so that total risk is minimized or financial stability 
is maximized.  Within this analytical framework, the paper argues 
that for any such policy to be successful over time it must pay close 
attention to the social welfare of all social classes, in particular that 
of the lower income groups.  This requires a constant monitoring 
of the economy and an adaptive dynamic and eclectic approach 
to policy formation.     
By setting the forthcoming analysis largely within the 
theoretical framework of macroeconomic financial stability and 
buttressing its development on the relevant empirical literature, 
this paper sits at the vortex of both and tries to contribute to the 
literature by exploiting the benefits afforded to case studies; an 
in depth analysis of a single economy whereby more effort can 
be dispensed to empirical details and subtle arguments. Hence, 
the paper contextualizes one of the central dilemmas of current 
monetary policy; its opportunity cost.    
The paper proceeds by characterizing the mechanism for 
contagion. Then, it proposes various ways to conceptualize and 
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measure macroeconomic financial fragility. Next, it introduces 
some data from Argentina and discusses the various policies used 
to shield the country from shocks.  The following section discusses 
political risk and introduces data on poverty and unemployment 
in Argentina to show why political risk is an important problem 
there.  In the discussion section, the paper tries to characterize the 
main issues confronting Argentine policy-makers and proposes 
some policy guidelines.  The last section summarizes the main 
points of the paper and suggests research extensions.  
PROPAGATION CHANNELS
Changes in monetary and fiscal policy abroad, changes in 
expectations, unexpected political and social events, shocks to 
natural resources, natural disasters and other changes affecting 
economic variables, real and financial, will find their way into 
the economies of less developed countries, affecting them in 
various ways.  
There are direct and indirect, or secondary, channels of 
transmission or contagion. For example, a restrictive monetary 
policy in the United States may induce greater capital outflows in, 
for example, Brazil and Argentina, as funds seek higher returns 
in dollar denominated deposits. This is the direct channel.
The secondary channels that have proven to be significant 
may be more complex to conceptualize because their profile 
depends on the following factors: the level of bilateral trade 
among the affected countries, the degree to which they share a 
common creditor or creditors, the degree in which they share 
common trade markets, and the exposure of investors to their 
economies (Hall and Taylor, 2002, p. 128-134; IMF, 2006, Ch. 
3, p. 30-5). 
 De Alessi Gracio et al. (2005, p. 96-97) argue that the 
behavior of institutional investors contributes to propagate crises 
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as they are forced to sell some of their instruments in various 
markets to cover their margin calls, reduce their portfolios’ risk 
or reduce the risk arising from their exposure to other markets 
when a crisis erupts in at least one market where investors are 
significantly exposed. The problem is further complicated by a 
combination of herd behavior and rational ignorance. When some 
of the largest investors, presumably better informed, begin to 
pull away from one market, the rest may follow without spending 
the effort to research the fundamentals, amplifying the effect of 
the shock in the original and connected markets. The momentum 
may be exacerbated by risk-averse managers whose remuneration 
is based on performance comparisons to other fund managers. 
Calvo and Mendoza (2000, p. 81) support these arguments, and 
Chui et al. (2004, p. 14) find that “(s)mall rumors can trigger 
herd behavior among investors, and shift an economy from a good 
equilibrium to a bad one, with large capital outflows unrelated 
to economic fundamentals.”   
Kaminsky et al. (2003, p. 56-72) provide empirical 
evidence from five crises, showing that common leveraged 
creditors play a significant role while propagation via trade 
links seems nonexistent.  The data also shows that the degree of 
propagation depends on how markets were anticipating crisis 
episodes.  Canova (2005, p. 231) also finds that the trade channel 
is not important but monetary policy in developed countries, a 
direct channel, is.  Villar Frexedas and Vayá (2005, p. 15) and Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001, p. 305) show, additionally, that the 
common lender factor is a significant propagation channel.
Contrary to other authors, Glick and Rose (1999, p. 604) 
argue that “…trade is an important channel for contagion, above 
and beyond macroeconomic influences. Countries who trade and 
compete with the targets of speculative attacks are themselves 
likely to be attacked.”   
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As the literature suggests, emerging economies are 
exposed to the outside world via trade and financial markets. 
Both, particularly the latter, will develop new channels as the 
markets for commodities and securities evolve. By their own 
nature, as countries become more developed, these markets will 
offer more complex instruments and greater depth, allowing 
agents to trade greater risk. Presumably, then, these economies 
will have to enhance their monitoring efforts in an attempt to 
reduce the impact of future crises in order to support a stable 
path of economic development.  
ASSESSING MACROECONOMIC FINANCIAL FRAGILITY
All countries are vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Emerging 
economies may be more vulnerable because their fundamental 
structures are, or may be perceived to be, weaker and their 
regulatory systems may lack some of the controls needed to deal 
with sudden capital flows.  There are a series of economic variables 
that could be used to monitor the fundamental macroeconomic 
health of a country.
In the face of an exogenous shock, funds will tend to flow 
out faster from those countries perceived ex-ante to have a greater 
risk of collapsing and a longer period of recovery.  The status 
of the current account, the government’s budget, the level of 
employment, investment and saving, foreign currency reserves, 
anti-cyclical fund accumulation, the level and structure of public 
debt, the functioning of the financial regulatory institutions, the 
degree of enforceable capital control mechanisms and the political 
and social situation will be used by banks and non-bank financial 
institutions to gauge the reliability of the system at the time of 
the shock.  Like a person who contracts a virus, the healthier the 
body, the shorter the time of recovery.
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According to Hilbers et al. (2000, p. 53), “...data on 
aggregate and sectoral growth, trends in the balance of payments, 
the level and volatility of inflation, interest and exchange rates, 
the growth of credit, and changes in asset prices, especially stock 
and real state prices…”, along with information regarding the 
vulnerability of the financial system and indicators of contagion 
and investor behavior, are all relevant macroeconomic indicators 
to asses the country’s ability to cope with capital flow reversals and 
currency crises.  The quality of regulatory institutions, including 
the legal infrastructure, should also be part of the analysis. And 
the authors add that “…[a]ssesments need to be based on a 
comprehensive set of indicators, taking into account the overall 
structure and economic situation of a country and its financial 
system” (p. 53-54). 
Grabel (2003, p. 252-3 and 2004, p. 28-30) argues that an 
exogenous shock leading to a rapid devaluation of the domestic 
currency may have a significant effect on the ability of domestic 
borrowers to repay foreign-currency denominated debt. This, in 
turn, may amplify the initial effect of the shock, giving rise to a 
massive sell-off of assets as panic ensues and possibly promotes 
and amplifies the initial contagion effect. Hence, exposure to the 
risk of foreign currency fluctuations needs to be continuously 
assessed by the monetary authority.      
The International Monetary Fund’s Global Financial 
Stability Report introduces a series of variables to assess financial 
fragility: volatility measures, debt cross correlations, equity 
indexes, returns on bonds and global yield spreads, and other 
financial soundness indicators for emerging markets (2006, 
Statistical Appendix, p. 163-195).  
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SOME DATA FOR ARGENTINA3
                                                           
This section presents a series of variables in an attempt to assess 
the financial vulnerability of the economy of Argentina. 
Consumer prices increased from an annualized index of 
3.7% in 2003 to 12.3% in 2005 and have remained stable within 
a range of between 9% and 12.3%.  Monthly data to June, 2006, 
shows low monthly variations around 1%.
Gross domestic product, GDP, increased at an annual 
average rate of 9% between 2003 and 2005 and is expected to 
grow by around 7% in 2006.  Consumption has been increasing 
at an average rate close to 8.5% of GDP and has remained stable. 
Investment has increased to about 21% of GDP and remained 
stable as well.  The unemployment rate has been steadily 
decreasing, reaching about 10.1% and has stabilized by the end 
of 2005. Average capacity utilization has reached the 70% mark 
and has been stable for over a year.  Both indexes measuring 
consumer and producer confidence have been stable for over a 
year as well. 
The country’s foreign debt has fallen from 128.6% of 
GDP in 2003 to 52.5% in the first quarter of 2006, while the 
government’s budget surplus has increased from 2.3% of GDP 
in 2003 to 3.7% in 2005 and 3.6% as of May, 2006. Meanwhile, 
the current account surplus has decreased from 6.2% of GDP in 
2003 to 2.4% in the first quarter of 2006, while the average for 
the period has been above 3% of GDP.    
3 Unless indicated otherwise data reported in this paper was obtained from 
official sources in Argentina, the Central Bank (http://www.bcra.gov.ar/) 
or the statistical division of the ministry of economics, INDEC (instituto 
nacional de estadísticas y censos, http://www.indec.mecon.ar/). 
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International reserves were 3.7% of GDP in 2003, 4.3% 
in 2004 and 5.2% in 2005. The implications of its use to stabilize 
currency fluctuations will be discussed below.
The Central Bank of Argentina has been implementing 
policies to gradually reduce the exposure of the financial sector 
to public sector debt. This exposure decreased by roughly half 
in two years, to an average of 27.7% of total assets of the entire 
financial system and 24.3% of total assets of private banks. 
By law, starting in July, 2007, no bank can hold more than 
35% of its assets in public debt, down from 40%. This will free 
up to about 12 billion pesos into the credit stream and will also 
reduce the exposure of the financial sector to foreign-currency 
denominated assets.4  According to the Central Bank there has 
been a tendency in the financial sector to reduce its overall 
exposure to dollar-denominated instruments. 
Data published by the Central Bank shows that the value 
of net assets for the entire financial system increased from about 
22 billion pesos in 2003 to 29 billion pesos as of April, 2006, or 
about 31%.  The return on assets grew from -2.9% of net assets, 
in 2003 to 1.5% in April 2006.  Return on equity grew from 
-22.7% in 2003 to 11.1% in April, 2006. And the percentage of 
irregular accounts fell from 17.7% to 4.8% in the same period. 
These tendencies still hold even if the data is disaggregated into 
public and private institutions.    
Data from the 2006 IMF Global Financial Stability Report 
shows that the equity market index in Argentina grew by 98.5% 
in 2003, 24.6% in 2004 and 59.7% in 2005, after exhibiting 
4 Clarin.com, “El central busca que los bancos den más crédito al sector 
privado,” July 10, 2006. And Comunicado N° 48576 from Banco Central de 
la República Argentina, available at www.bcra.gov.ar.
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negative growth in each of the three previous years. For the 
2003-5 period, the global total returns index has been increasing 
and the global yield spread decreasing.  This, in part, may be 
explained by the fact that the country has been restructuring its 
debt into longer terms, thereby reducing its risk factor (Chapter 
3, p. 29-30).  For the same period the bank regulatory capital to 
risk-weighted assets ratio has been increasing, the nonperforming 
loans to total loans ratio has been falling, and the bank provisions 
to nonperforming loans ratio has been increasing (Appendix, p. 
163-195).  
The information above suggests certain degree of 
macroeconomic stability. Inflation has increased since 2003 but 
remained stable, investment has increased and stabilized, and a 
corresponding picture emerges from the unemployment and 
capacity utilization figures. The twin surpluses, together with 
an increasing level of international reserves, depict an economy 
standing on more solid ground than four years ago, as the falling 
spreads and increasing stock market index suggest, although 
this is a short run position. That this is understood as such is 
partly supported by the reluctance of new investment to expand 
installed capacity.
The financial sector is reducing its exposure to the fluctua-
tions of foreign currencies and is shifting its resources from the 
public to the private sector as well. The sector’s assets have in-
creased over time and it is becoming more profitable, while its 
asset composition is becoming more solid, sending a signal of 
some strength to current and potential investors. This stability, ho-
wever, depends in a significant fashion on a relatively calm global 
economy. Hence, investors can see a firm commitment from the 
monetary authority to continue along the current policy path, but 
the imminence of external shocks may partly explain the resistance 
of direct investment to further expand industrial capacity.     
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POLICIES TO DEAL WITH EXOGENOUS SHOCKS
The importance of having an economy that seems to be in good 
shape or that, at least, is able to project an image of strength to the 
world has been established earlier in this paper as an important 
factor in shaping the expectations and, consequently, the behavior 
of economic actors, in particular institutional investors, in the face 
of an exogenous shock. Obviously, the government of Argentina 
is not only concerned with the cosmetic aspects of the model, 
as the fundamental variables do change partly in response to its 
workings rather than to intended manipulation.  
Aside from reaping the benefits from window dressing, the 
government has engaged in various explicit policies in an attempt 
to isolate the economy from external changes. The accumulation 
of international reserves to defend the currency during periods 
of capital flight, along with the limited use of capital control 
tools, may have contributed to partly shield the economy from 
exogenous shocks. The Central Bank has also implemented a 
policy to change the structure of the public debt towards longer 
maturity, along with the emission of debt denominated in pesos 
in an attempt to decrease the exposure of public finances to 
currency fluctuations.  For instance, Central Bank data (July, 
2006) show that the average duration of government instruments 
has increased from about 250 to 370 days between April, 2005, 
and July, 2006, while over half of the stock exhibits maturity dates 
of at least one year and over 75% of the total stock has maturities 
of no less than 6 months.
Additionally, 10% of the public debt instruments are 
indexed by an inflation coefficient. The Central Bank has stopped 
their issuance and is retrieving them because the demand for 
other instruments without indexation can absorb the entire debt 
structure, a benefit from a stronger position and a greater external 
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risk appetite, thereby allowing the government to insulate future 
debt from price volatility. 
The international reserves have increased from 14 million 
dollars in 2003 to more than 25 million as of June, 2006. These 
reserves have been used to maintain the value of the dollar stable 
within a band and these interventions have been sterilized in order 
to control the inflationary pressures from domestic currency 
emission.  For example, during the first semester of 2006 the 
Central Bank sterilized 13 billion pesos, 65% of which was done 
with earlier cancellations of public instruments.  
A problem arising from sterilization is the effect it might 
have on interest rates as the monetary authority offers successive 
instruments in the money market (Lee 1997, p. 1-2; Christensen 
2004, p. 26). For example, the call money rate increased more 
than 300% since 2003, from 1.7% in 2003 to 6.7% in 2005 and 
7% in June, 2006. Two public instruments increased 30% and 
95% for the same period of time, while 30-day deposits earned 
an increase of 78%. Upward pressure is expected for 2006 
and 2007 because the government has requested the Central 
Bank to meet future obligations with new emissions in order 
to maintain the current levels of reserves in an attempt to send 
signals of strength to market players.5  Hence, sterilization may 
induce a sort of restraint on other economic indicators via its 
impact on the expansion of consumer and producer credit and 
may also induce additional capital inflows (Stiglitz 2002, p. 224). 
Sterilization also means that the central bank “…acquired low-
yield foreign-exchange reserves and issued high-yield sterilization 
bonds” (Kaminsky 2005, p. 20), adding some extra cost to the 
5  Página 12, “Estrategia de pagar deuda sin merma de las reservas,” July 26, 
2006, http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/principal/index.html
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policy.  The spread between yields could be considered a social 
cost (Rodrik 2006, p. 2).    
To deal with the destabilizing effects of short term capital 
inflows the government implemented a series of measures. One 
measure allows exporters to extend the time requirement to 
deposit their dollar earnings in the country. This would mitigate, 
to some extent the sterilizing effort during seasonal liquidations 
of primary commodities. Banks can also hold an additional 5% 
of their reserves in dollars. In addition, all speculative capital, of 
at least two million dollars per month, excluding purchases of 
public instruments, must remain in the country for a year while 
30% of it will become a non-remunerated deposit that cannot be 
used for collateralization or any other purpose.6 Similar measures 
were taken by Chile, Colombia and other countries (Williamson 
1998, p. 66 and Ocampo 2005, p. 12-15).  Capital controls also 
mitigate the effects of the externalities arising from financial 
instability (Stiglitz 2002, p. 230).    
In order to increase the degree of liquidity in the private 
financial system the Central Bank has implemented a law allowing 
banks to offer improved incentives to longer fixed deposits. At 
present financial entities are allowed to offer 180 days fixed 
deposits with a variable interest but with a minimum assured 
rate and preferential rates for deposits above one million pesos.7 
Peso denominated fixed deposits of at least 180 days will no 
longer have to have reserves with the Central Bank.8 This new 
credit structure is complemented by an increase in the reserve 
requirements on short term deposits, from 17% to 19%, and 
6  Resolución 365/2005 entitled Mercado Cambiario (foreign Exchange mar-
ket), available at www.bcra.gov.ar. 
7  Comunicado (law) N° 48566, 6/27/2006. 
8  From Clarín.com, July 21, 2006, “El central modificó los encajes.” 
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the elimination of interest yield to them, as well as to the excess 
liquidity from investment funds. In other words, it is a concerted 
effort to promote the reallocation of funds to productive uses by 
allowing for an increment in the reward for long term savings 
and simultaneously penalizing short term deposits.  This increases 
the degree of liquidity, thereby diminishing, to some extent, the 
fragility of the system by allowing for better risk management 
within financial institutions.       
  As of August 2006, a plan to use local currencies to pay 
for bilateral trade flows between Argentina and Brazil was being 
contemplated as a first step towards the formation of a regional 
common currency. If successful, this may protect the region from 
future dollar fluctuations, depending on the initial conditions of 
each country at the time of the shock.9  
In sum, the data suggests that Argentina’s monetary 
authority is adopting a battery of measures, consistent with 
the current literature, to minimize the impact of exogenous 
shocks on the financial and, ultimately, the real sector of the 
economy.  However, shocks could also be generated internally 
as a consequence of unstable socio-economic conditions leading 
to political instability.  This source of risk is important and must 
be taken into consideration by policy-makers.   
POLITICAL RISK
It is an accepted fact in the literature on financial risk that the 
political and social situation of a country is at least as important 
as the state of its finances.  Lensink et al. (2002) find a robust 
correlation between political risk and capital flight. Kashiwase 
9 From Página 12, July 25, 2006, “Propuesta para borrar el dólar de las opera-
ciones del MERCOSUR.”
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and Kodres (2005, p. 43) incorporate government stability, 
socioeconomic conditions, external conflict, internal conflict, 
corruption, military in politics, law and order and bureaucratic 
quality among the political risk-rating variables used in their 
regression analysis.  Erb et al. (1996, 1999) include political risk 
in the analysis of bond spreads and Bilson et al. (2002, p. 1) argue 
that “…political risk is important in explaining return variation 
in individual emerging markets…”  Along with the IMF’s Global 
Financial Stability Report, the papers use the data provided by 
the Political Risk Services. Le and Zak (2006, p.308) submit that 
“…political instability is the most important factor associated 
with capital flight.” They also argue that political risk is captured 
by socio-political instability and regime change (p. 314). Both of 
these are pertinent factors in the case of Argentina. The former 
is affected by the levels of poverty and unemployment and the 
latter by the impending presidential election of 2008.    
An unstable social situation, such as high unemployment 
and chronic poverty, may promote political instability leading to 
uncertainty about the government and its economic plan (Tokman 
2003, p. 95-6; Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999, p. 22-3; Stiglitz 
2003, p. 27-8). As analysts revise their risk factors, the speed and 
direction of capital flows may vary, thus affecting the real economy 
via changes in currencies and interest rates and amplifying the 
effect through the country-specific sentiment component.  The 
length and gravity of the ensuing crises following a shock will 
depend on the initial economic and political conditions at the 
time of the shock, internal and external, and the history of the 
country. 
Moreover, in Argentina chronic poverty levels and high 
unemployment and underemployment may give rise to political 
opposition leading to decreasing support from the more 
disadvantaged sectors of society.  Hence, policies addressing 
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poverty and unemployment, above and beyond those that favor 
market-based incentives for direct investment, should become 
a de facto component of a complex set of policy measures within 
the larger framework of prudent risk management. 
The next four sections attempt to explain in some detail 
the reasons behind the persistence of relatively high levels of 
unemployment and poverty in Argentina.  
THE DATA ON POVERTY
In the first semester of 2005 about 38% of the total population 
and 28% of households were below the poverty line, while 
13% and 10%, respectively, were below the indigent line.  The 
numbers have been improving since the first semester of 2003, 
when 54% of the population was under the poverty line.
In the second semester of 2003, 63% of children below 
the age of 14 were poor and 30 % were indigent. The numbers 
were slightly lower for the 14 to 22 year old group. The data 
shows no difference by gender.  By the first semester of 2005 
these numbers had fallen to 55% and 22%, respectively.  In the 
23 to 64 age group, 32% are poor and 10% are indigent.  By and 
large, poverty deals its strongest punch to the population below 
the age of 14. 
In the second semester of 2004 an average of 4.5 people 
lived in poor households and 4.68 in indigent ones. On the 
average, poor households had 1.5 children below the age of 14, 
while indigent households had 1.79 children below that age. In 
other words, more children lived in indigent conditions. On the 
other hand, on the average, each household above the poverty 
line had only .5 children. 
Between the second semester of 2003 and the first semester 
of 2004 the number of households below the poverty line fell by 
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3%. The same number repeats itself between the second semester 
and the first in 2004. In terms of individuals, the rate of poverty 
fell by 7% between the first and second semester of 2003, by 
3.5% in the first semester of 2004 and by 4% in the second 
semester of 2004. In the first semester of 2005 the number falls 
by 1.7% for the entire country. However, the annual change for 
Buenos Aires, and surrounding areas, where about one third of 
the population lives, did not show an improvement.  
Data on the socio-economic structure, and per capita 
income by household since May 2003 reveals that, aside from 
minor fluctuations, the top 10% of the population earned, 
roughly, 30% of national income and that the group of people who 
are below them and above the poverty line received about 52% 
of the pie.  These numbers do not show a trend but rather exhibit 
minor fluctuations from one quarter to the next, suggesting that, 
in spite of the impressive growth rate of the economy, the ongoing 
policy of the current  administration has not managed to alter 
in a significant fashion the underlying socio-economic structure 
that existed in 2003. Other data classifying income by individuals 
shows similar structural rigidity. 
Data disaggregated by region yields a more revealing 
picture of the socioeconomic structure in the first quarter of 
2005.  While the average poverty rate is 38.5% for the country, 
two regions are particularly extreme cases: the northeast and 
the northwest.  In the former, over 56% of the population is 
below the poverty line; in the latter, 49.5%. In the two regions 
the percentage of children living under the poverty line is 71% 
and 63%, respectively, compared to the 55% national average. 
In a couple of places the numbers reach 75%. The north region 
includes 11 provinces, out of a total of 23, and about one third 
of the land surface, where, according to 2006 estimates, nearly 
a quarter of the population resides.  
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In sum, the data suggests that during the Kirchner govern-
ment some people have managed to escape poverty. However, 
the rate of improvement is decreasing over time, suggesting the 
presence of a plateau. The rigidity displayed by the underlying 
socioeconomic structure presents another battle front for the 
administration. The numbers also reveal an alarming number 
of children living below the poverty line, many being indigent. 
This is a serious problem because these children are not receiving 
adequate nutrition and education.  And they will be competing 
with cohorts all over the world for jobs that are being outsourced 
to the most productive workers.  Clearly, these youngsters will 
have a diminished intellectual capacity stemming from deficient 
nutrition during their formative years and a lack of a competitive 
education, as many of them must work or beg for sustenance. 
Finally, policies to mitigate poverty need to incorporate regional 
differences in order allocate resources proportionally to the 
problem and to design programs addressing local needs.  
The internal dynamics of the momentum propelling the 
inertia of chronic poverty may map itself into decreasing policy 
credibility and ultimately political resistance leading to greater 
political risk.       
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES
The economy experienced an ascending trend in unemployment 
since 1998, peaking in May, 2002, and descending thereafter. 
Moreover, the rate of unemployment has been in the two digit 
range since 1993.  According to Lindenboim et al. (2005), in 
1993 40% of national income went to wages. By 2004 that share 
fell to 24%.
In the third quarter of 2005 the level of unemployment 
was 11% and the level of underemployment was 13%. Roughly, 
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a quarter of the people in the labor market had problems 
finding employment. This represented an improvement of 2% 
in both categories relative to the same period in 2004. The 
unemployment level fell by 5% beginning in the third quarter 
of 2003 and by almost 10% after the first quarter of the same 
year.  However, the levels of underemployment fell by just 4% 
in the same period.  
The government reports two different numbers to account 
for the statistical impact that a subsidy program has on the levels 
of unemployment: plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar (female and male 
head of household plan). The downward trend does not change 
by excluding the impact of this program, but the levels change 
by about 3%. In other words, the actual number of unemployed 
people increases to 14 % without the program. 
Since 2002, among those who found new jobs, 72% did so 
in the private formal sector while 20% found jobs in the private 
informal sector and 8% found employment in the public sector. 
The formal sector of the economy encompasses about half of the 
labor force. The other half works in sectors that generate lower 
paying and unstable jobs, particularly in construction. This may 
be one of the reasons why the levels of poverty are decreasing but 
at a decreasing rate, reaching a plateau. The other reason could 
be related to the levels of capacity utilization in the industrial 
sector. The average rate, roughly 70%, has been stable for the last 
two years and over 70% of the firms do not anticipate changes 
in capacity utilization for 2006.10  
Also, about half of exports originate in the agricultural 
and manufacturing of primary products sectors of the economy 
that together only generate 18% of total employment. The 
10  From “Utilización de la capacidad instalada”, page 1, January 2006, INDEC. 
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manufacturing sector has also contributed to exports, but once 
disaggregated it is evident that, for instance, while automobiles 
are a significant component of exports, the transactions are 
just intra-firm due to Argentina’s integration in MERCOSUR, 
the regional market. In addition, the metal-processing industry 
(aluminum, iron, and plain tubes) contribute to economic growth 
as well but, all are capital intensive.11 Disaggregated data by sector 
for 2002 shows that about 4.9% of the workers in the industrial 
sector worked in the automobile sector, about 3.7% worked in 
metals, and 5.4% in the production of goods made with metal, 
including tubes, but not exclusively.12
Data for 2004 shows that gains in employment between 
the third quarter of 2003 and 2004 were strongest for hotels and 
restaurants, 56.5%, construction, 21.7%, other services, 22%, 
and lagging behind them and other sectors came manufacturing, 
7.3%, confirming that its growth does not necessarily generates 
employment.13    
In other words, gains in income, in particular for those 
below the poverty line, may be obtained through a gain in real 
salaries rather than a gain in the number of jobs available to them. 
In particular, the construction sector may also slow down as 
speculative capital that entered the sector in recent years begins 
to shift to other assets.  Real wages are also affected by inflation 
which in turn is connected to the composition of aggregate 
demand, economic concentration, price setting behavior and 
government policy. These issues will be discussed below.      
11  From Página 12, October 5, 2005, “Boom exportador (primario)”: http://
www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/principal/index.html
12  From Ministerio de Economía, 2006, http://www.mecon.gov.ar/
peconomica/basehome/infoeco.html, asalariados por rubro. 
13  From “El Nuevo Entorno Macroeconómico: Revirtiendo las tendencias de los 
indicadores sociales”, Ministerio de economía y producción, 2004.
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In terms of real wages, on the average, those who work 
in the informal sector earn about half as much as their peers in 
the formal sector. Most of these jobs are unstable, low-paid and 
seasonal.14 Data for the last quarter of 2004 clearly shows that 
workers in the informal sector earned substantially less.15 Data 
released in February, 2006, reveals that since the government 
took power, in May, 2003, until December, 2005, the nominal 
wage in the formal sector increased by 45% and by 26% in 2005. 
The respective numbers for workers in the informal sector were 
38% and 12.5% and for the public sector, 19% and 12.8%.16  For 
the same two periods inflation was 21% and 12.5%, respectively. 
The annual growth rate of jobs in the informal sector has been 
greater than in the formal sector, as measured by quarterly data 
in three out of the four quarters between 2003 and 2004.17
The empirical evidence presented in this section suggests 
that, under current conditions, gains in the labor market will 
only occur in sectors that require relatively low amounts of 
capital to expand, mainly tourism and services. That expansion 
may or may not have a significant impact on the levels of poverty 
because by their very nature these activities can be rendered in 
the informal sector of the economy where wages are substantially 
lower.  Tokman (2003, pp. 84) supports these findings and argues 
that “…services associated with globalization and modernization, 
although increasingly important, are still not significant.” The 
hotel and restaurant sector is extremely sensitive to currency 
14 From Clarín, September 28, 2005, “El empleo en negro subió en la Capital y 
en Rosario”: http://www.clarin.com/
15 From “El Nuevo Entorno Macroeconómico: Revirtiendo las tendencias de los 
indicadores sociales”, Ministerio de economía y producción, 2004. 
16 From “Índice de salarios y coeficiente de variación salarial,” INDEC, 2006. 
17  From “El Nuevo Entorno Macroeconómico: Revirtiendo las tendencias de los 
indicadores sociales”, Ministerio de economía y producción, 2004.
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fluctuations.  This means that the gains in the poverty levels are 
tied to the ability of the government to maintain a competitive 
exchange rate and are also tied to external factors, regional and 
global conditions.  
Conceptually the policy-maker faces the ongoing dilemma 
of having to choose between allocating resources to obtain addi-
tional units of risk insurance versus diverting funds towards 
improving social conditions. Ironically, both policies can increase 
political risk if implemented outside a sort of “optimally balanced 
range.”  Finding this “balance” requires a continuous close reading 
of the local economy contextualized by the global conditions.   
SOURCES AND INCIDENCE OF INFLATION
The average inflation rate in Argentina was 14.8% in 2003, 
4.4% in 2004 and 9.6% in 2005. In 2005 the annual inflation 
rate was estimated to be 12.3% in December. Disaggregated 
data shows that food and beverages, clothing, shelter, education 
and health services displayed the greater levels of inflation. With 
the exception of health services, the aforementioned categories 
exhibited annual inflation rates above the average for December 
2005, for both education and food and beverages of 15.7%. On 
the other hand, the cost of entertainment, transportation and 
communications increased by 9.4% and 7.5%, respectively.18  
The price increase in food, shelter and education indicates 
the regressive nature of the structure of inflation in Argentina. 
Data released in February, 2006, shows that the price of the basic 
basket of goods for a household, the one needed to be above the 
poverty line, increased by 12.3% in 2005, practically matching 
18  From Secretaría de Política Económica and INDEC, 2006. 
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inflation. In other words, inflation has a greater incidence on 
those goods consumed by poor and lower income families.  The 
regressive effect is accentuated by the fact that many children 
live under the poverty line.         
There are various channels within the current system 
by which prices increase. One way is via the price setting beha-
vior exhibited by concentrated groups of producers in the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Another way is by the 
effect that imported intermediate capital goods have on the 
cost structure of companies. A third way is via the demand for 
imported consumption goods, durables and non-durables, most 
noticeable automobiles. And a fourth way is via the increase in 
compensation to labor.  
The government has been explicitly dealing with various 
groups of producers of tradable goods who, according to the 
government, fuel inflation by passing on to the consumers 
price changes that are not consistent with their cost structure, 
thereby allowing them to capture greater profits and fueling 
greater inflation expectations. From the producers’ perspective 
the international prices are the reference signals to them, and 
anything below that is cutting into their profit rate. To change 
the incentives the government has imposed a series of tariffs 
on exports designed to equalize the post-tariff price to the 
desired domestic target. The plan has worked only partially 
because in practice it has been difficult for the government to 
control domestic prices and to convince some groups to sign 
agreements. 
The case of the beef producers is emblematic of 
Argentine history.  There are two associations that represent 
two different type of producers, the Sociedad Rural (SR) and 
the Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas (CRA). The former 
represents the old moneyed class, the traditional families with 
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political ties and influence. The have large holdings, from 1,500 
to 20,000 hectares and more, and the owners live in the plush 
neighborhoods of Buenos Aires,  far away from their source 
of income. SR has about 8000 members. CRA, on the other 
hand, has about 100,000 members with average land holding 
of 300 to 1,500 hectares. They live close to their land and 
supervise the daily operations.  Both associations are fighting 
with the government over the issue of export tariffs. Former 
officials of both associations are working as consultants for the 
more reactionary parties in Congress today. Through them the 
two organizations are able to channel political pressure on the 
government.19 The negotiation along the entire production and 
distribution chain varies significantly and demands a case by case 
negotiation by the government with representatives of different 
groups that may oscillate among various postures, depending on 
the circumstances around the negotiation process.20
  The government has also been attempting to control 
prices on a basic subset of the consumption basket by negotiating 
with a group representing supermarket chains and also large 
producers.  There are nine supermarket chains divided into two 
associations that represent their interests. An example of this is 
an agreement signed by Colgate-Palmolive and Reckitt Benckiser 
to control the prices of 22 articles for personal hygiene and 
household cleaning. The government has also announced that it 
will seek an agreement with other large corporations in the area 
of textiles.21 Negotiations are also taking place with producers of 
19  From, Página 12, February 5, 2006, “Del mismo pedigree que Martínez de 
Hoz.”
20  From, Página 12, February 5, 2006, “El quién es quién de los ganaderos.”
21  Clarin.com, February 2nd, 2006, “Los supermercados y el gobierno prorro-
garon el acuerdo por 10 días.” 
revista de economía del caribe nº1 (2008) págs. 1-45[26]
POLICIES TO REDUCE INSTABILITY
goods purchased by elementary and high school students in order 
to mitigate the effect on the budgets of low income families.22
The importation of intermediate goods has also been a 
source of inflation. In 2005, the prices of oil lubricants increased 
by 54%, those of intermediate goods to service and upgrade 
capital increased by 32%, and those of both capital goods and 
transportation equipment increased by 33% and 34%, respec-
tively. The increase in value can be explained by a 7% increase 
in the volume of intermediate goods and a 13% increase in their 
price, while the numbers for oil and lubricants are 10% and 
39%, respectively.23  The reliance on intermediate goods during 
a period of expansion, coupled with a general increase in their 
price level, is channeled to consumers via their effect on the 
price of final goods.    
The demand for consumer durable and non durable imports 
has also had an impact on prices. The value of consumer imported 
goods increased by 27% in 2005. Medications, refrigerators, shoes 
and their parts, and motorcycles led the pack. Disaggregated data 
shows that durables and non durables increased by 39% and 32%, 
respectively. Automobiles increased by 34%. It should be noted 
that cellular telephones and computers are not considered final 
consumer goods, but they also increased significantly, 33%, and 
should be counted as part of this category, to some extent.  By 
and large, most of these goods were consumed by the middle 
and upper classes. This is particularly true for automobiles, the 
purchase of which normally requires incomes high enough to 
have access to credit. This means that the effect these imports 
22  Clarin.com, February 7th, 2006, “Intentan cerrar hoy un acuerdo por los 
guardapolvos, zapatillas y útiles.” 
23  From, “Intercambio comercial Argentino,” January 2006, INDEC. 
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had on the prices of basic goods and services becomes an implicit 
inter-class tax or transfer.24   
The government has been also negotiating with organized 
labor in order to achieve an agreement on wages to be paid by 
large corporations.  While the unions demand an increase of at 
least 15% and preferably 35%, according to them to recover and 
maintain their purchasing power, the government is hoping that 
a 20% increase would be an acceptable offer.  They hope to get 
inflation expectations under control.25 Currently the government 
is acting as a mediator between 13 different labor organizations 
and representatives from various production sectors.
In sum, while the current literature, e. g. Choudhri et 
al. (2005), on pass-through effects ascertains that changes in 
exchanges rates have little effect on consumer prices, inflation 
partially induced by imported goods, nonetheless, erodes the real 
wages of consumers through various channels in the economy.  It 
is clear from the data that the structure of inflation punishes the 
lower classes more than the rest of the system. The government 
is trying to control the level of prices by engaging producers 
and distributors of goods, in particular of those goods that are 
important components of the basket of low income households, 
but the battle is being fought industry by industry denouncing 
the level of market power enjoyed by producers in each sector 
of the economy and their informal connections to the spheres of 
power. And according to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2006, 
pp. 39) inflation in Argentina is expected to be 12.9% in 2006 
and 15% in 2007. 
24  Ibid.
25 Clarin.com, February 5, 2006, “El gobierno intenta que los sueldos no suban 
más del 20%.”
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The regressive nature of inflation in Argentina could 
contribute to increased political risk via its deleterious effect 
on the living standards of a large number of people. This is why 
the government is trying, via formal and informal means, to 
control it.  
CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH AND JOB CREATION26
Data capturing the supply side of the economy suggests that its 
ability to absorb more labor is beginning to decline. Since 2003 
average capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector has 
increased from 64% to 73% and remained stable around the 70th 
percentile. Meanwhile, investment increased from 15% to 19% 
of GDP between 2003 and 2004 and has remained at around 
20% since then.
Data on annual growth in 2005 shows that the automobile 
sector has grown by 26.7%, cement producers by 21.7%, 
and other construction materials by 21.4%. Data available for 
2002 reveals that about 4.9% of the work force was producing 
automobiles, and data for 2004 indicates that about 5% of the 
labor force works in the construction sector, the latter earning 
relatively low wages.  In other words, the more dynamic industrial 
sectors do not demand much labor and the construction sector 
not only pays lower wages but is, by its very nature, one that 
typically recurs to informal work.  
Data shows that the boom in construction is mostly 
concentrated in relatively expensive real estate. Out of 48 
neighborhoods in Buenos Aires, a city of more than three million 
people, about half of the construction took place in the five more 
26 Data for industrial activity comes from monthly reports by INDEC.
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expensive areas. And there is a consensus in the sector that while 
the demand will continue to grow for a while it will eventually 
satisfy the needs of the top earners. The lack of credit for middle 
income consumers also has a negative effect on demand, although 
credit has been growing in 2005.27
Additionally, while the automobile industry is operating 
below 40% capacity, 72.5% of the official survey’s respondents 
in the sector thought that there would be no expansion in 2006. 
Capacity fell from 53.5% in November to 34.4% in December, 
2005.  And while the numbers could be reflecting seasonal effects 
it is likely that producers are going to wait before expanding 
investment and employment in the sector.  
In 2002, about 30% of the labor force was engaged in the 
manufacture of food products and beverages. Except for the 
obvious seasonal changes, capacity utilization in the industry has 
remained between 70 and 75%. Hence, changes in labor demand 
at this point tend to be seasonal in an industry where informal 
work is easy to conceal and salaries tend be lower than average 
and probably much lower than what the official data shows when 
the formal and informal sectors are combined. 
Another industry that has exhibited greater capacity utili-
zation during 2005 is the manufacture of non-metallic minerals. 
The industry is working at almost 60% capacity and is relatively 
capital intensive. Its impact on the demand for labor will be 
insignificant, and, since it is approaching levels of utilization 
requiring some investment, the industry is likely to postpone 
making plant changes.  Additionally, the wages in this industry 
are below average for the sector.
27  From Clarín.com, February 23, 2006, “La construcción de viviendas, concen-
trada en pocos barrios.”
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In 1993, 161 (32%) of the 500 largest firms were contro-
lled, partially or totally, by foreign owners. The number increased 
steadily and reached 286, or (57%), by 2002. In 1993 they cap-
tured 65% of profits compared with 85% in 2002. In 1993 they 
hired 22% of the workers in the industrial sector, and by 2002 
that percentage had increased to 55%. This means that labor 
demand is more sensitive to changes in these large firms. Foreign 
ownership suggests that direct investment and technological 
innovations are more likely to enter the plant after the value 
added has been incorporated elsewhere in the world because 
the owners do not have a personal interest in developing local 
suppliers when these are already established abroad and may be 
part of the same financial umbrella. Therefore, demand for labor 
may be limited not only by the amount of investment but also 
its type. If innovations are introduced elsewhere in the world 
then higher wages may be captured by workers abroad limiting 
productivity, and real wages, growth at home. Hence, domestic 
workers do not have an incentive to obtain additional technical 
training, thus limiting their capacity to signal potential investors 
of their ability to work with new technologies.
Data on capital imports suggest that by the time capital 
goods are imported they have a significant component of value 
accrued outside the country. In 2005 the importation of capital 
goods increased by 33%. That growth was led by cellular phones, 
computers, and inputs for the metallurgic and plastic industries. 
In terms of total imports, 25% were capital goods, in particular 
for the automobile industry, 36% intermediate goods and 17% for 
parts and accessories for capital goods.  In other words, 78% of 
imports were for goods that accrue value added before reaching 
the country.  The corresponding jobs were created elsewhere.
According to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2006, pp. 
39), the country’s growth rate will slow down in 2006 and 2007 
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to 7.3% and 4% respectively, which seems to be consistent with 
the data presented in this paper. In other words, under these 
conditions unemployed and underemployed workers will face a 
difficult market and one that does not pay that well. About 70% 
of an official survey’s respondents did not anticipate any hires or 
an increase in hours for the first three months of 2006. And data 
shows that about 38% of labor works more than 46 hours per 
week.  The various pieces of evidence together explain, partially, 
why the improvement in unemployment figures is decreasing and 
reaching a plateau over time.   
In sum, expansion of labor demand seems to face two diffe-
rent structural constraints. On the one hand, the more dynamic 
sectors of the economy tend to demand less labor than other 
sectors and are not planning to expand their productive capacity 
unless the market signals change in the future. On the other hand, 
the productive structure and managerial interest will continue 
to demand capital and intermediate goods produced largely 
outside the country, thus preventing the transfer and adaptation 
of new technologies with a significant value added component 
from labor. Hence, labor demand will be constrained by the 
demand to fill positions for workers whose increase in salary will 
mostly depend on added hours and marginally on increases in 
productivity because industries where technological innovations 
are developed will not establish their operations in Argentina for 
the time being.  
This may send a negative signal to young workers planning 
to improve their technical skills in order to compete with workers 
elsewhere. They may correctly perceive that the marginal return 
on additional education is lower than consumption of leisure 
or other forms of training.  Tokman (2003, pp. 90) argues the 
same point for other countries. The internal dynamics of the 
situation –its momentum– is reinforced by the fact that roughly 
65% of households in Argentina are below an income threshold 
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associated with significant high school desertion rates, about 
46%. Meanwhile, data shows that about 40% of the jobs requiring 
secondary-level skills go unfilled, thereby cementing the bases 
for further social exclusion potentially leading to lower levels of 
policy credibility.28   
Potentially, the above situation may generate a contradiction 
within the system. If profits continue to accrue to the current 
stock of net investment but social indicators do not improve 
sufficiently to support a stable social and political environment, 
then the risk factor may push a portion of investment away 
from productive and into more speculative or transitory assets. 
Under certain conditions this shift will not only aggravate social 
tensions, through lower expectations, but may breed inflation 
into the system via the real estate sector or some other asset, 
just as recently happened in the United States. Or it may migrate 
towards other markets to fuel a bubble there. Ultimately the 
direction of the financial flows will partly determine where and 
how the redistributive effects are accrued. It is possible, as argued 
elsewhere in this paper, that secondary effects could be felt in 
Argentina via contagion if the bubble erupts in a country that has 
intense financial and trade links with Argentina.
Once more, the policy-maker’s dilemma shows its face. 
Policies to create more jobs may be inhibited due to the need to 
stabilize the financial sector and maintain it stable over time. The 
next section discusses this and other issues. 
DISCUSSION
The data and discussion presented above suggest that current 
monetary policy in Argentina has been hijacked by its own 
28  From Página 12, August 14, 2006, “Crece la curva de deserción.”
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purpose away from its expansionary capacity to accomplish 
the dual goal of simultaneously stabilizing relative prices and 
minimizing their impact, and in turn on the real economy, from 
the impact arising from exogenous shocks.
Fiscal policy is constrained by the fact that over time a 
greater percentage of the national product is being allocated to the 
accumulation of international reserves and a smaller portion to a 
newly formed anti-cyclical fund. This means that, in spite of the 
fact that the country has been growing at a fast pace and that tax 
revenues have increased, the government’s ability to redirect the 
newly created wealth is limited by its own stabilization policy.
The limited ability of monetary and fiscal policy to reduce 
the levels of unemployment and poverty above and beyond what 
the market mechanism and the structure of the economy can 
bear essentially characterizes the central problem being faced by 
the Argentine government. The internal dynamics of the system 
suggest that for the current policy to be successful in the long 
run it must yield enough improvement in the unemployment 
and poverty indexes to mitigate a political backlash and ensuing 
risk that may arise from it otherwise. This demands constant 
monitoring of the social and political conditions of all social classes 
in the country in order to manage political risk appropriately. 
In other words, this risk needs to be managed and characterized 
like any other risk.
All said, it seems that Argentina is purchasing a sort of 
stability insurance at a rate of roughly 6% of GDP, reserves 
and stabilizing fund, plus the policy-bound externalities arising 
from unemployment and poverty resulting from a conservative 
approach to fiscal policy and the opportunity cost arising from 
currency sterilization. This suggests that a tradeoff exists, 
that some aspects of the current policy could be altered to 
mitigate the long run political risk associated with the negative 
externalities. 
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A slight modification of the current policy may include a 
more dynamic conception of internal financial flows whereby 
resources do not sit idle, or earning nominal fees, but rather 
flow sporadically to nodes in the system where risk factors are 
beginning to mount above prudential levels. For example, a 
portion of the fiscal surplus could be used as temporal collateral to 
extend credit to small domestic ventures that are labor intensive 
in order to reduce unemployment in an impoverished locality 
without increasing risk in the banking system. In other words, 
credit could be extended to higher risk groups without affecting 
the integrity of the banking system. This would amount to a sort 
of macroeconomic prudential risk management technique where 
the market provides signals and incentives and the public sector 
acts as a backstage catalytic instrument, thereby minimizing dis-
tortions. 
Similar arguments have been used, whereby the optimality 
of reserve accumulation has come under scrutiny. The main argu-
ment is that many developing countries have been accumulating 
more than traditional benchmarks, measured in terms of 
months of imports, for example, and that the excess could be 
put to better use. The literature, including this paper, disagrees 
on benchmarks and measurements, but agrees that developing 
countries can do better than simply hold dollars or highly liquid 
low-yield instruments.  
Rodrik (2006) argues that there is a social cost to pay for 
holding excess reserves and posits that capital controls may be 
used as a tool to stabilize flows without sacrificing the opportunity 
cost of holding foreign currency, but acknowledges that capital 
controls are politically less feasible. The government of Argentina 
has both but has been dubbed as “interventionist” in some quarters 
for its capital controls policy only.  Summers (2006) also believes 
that reserves are too high in many developing countries and 
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calls for a reform in their strategies. Hauner (2005) attempts 
to measure the opportunity cost of holding reserves and argues 
that countries should diversify their holdings into instruments 
with longer maturities. Aizenman and Lee (2005) argue that 
most developing countries hold excess reserves mostly as a pre-
cautionary measure, a self-insurance. This may be the case in 
Argentina.  
With a slightly different approach, García and Soto (2006) 
argue that the levels of reserves need to be compared to the 
potential costs of a crisis. From their perspective most countries 
are holding adequate levels.  Their method controls for the quality 
of political institutions and they conclude that it is better to be 
liquid than to depend on the technocrats to solve a shortage of 
cash. To some extent, this may also be a sentiment at the Central 
Bank. Their argument supplements the agency problem argued 
in Summers (2006). The President of any Central Bank may 
take a riskier approach and allocate some of the reserves into 
higher-yield instruments. However, they will not do so because 
the public recognition from earning greater returns on the bank’s 
reserves is significantly lower than the derision they will get if 
they earn negative rents. Then it becomes a rational choice to 
act conservatively unless the terms for chairmanship become 
long enough to provide additional incentives for them to take 
additional risks, but this may introduce moral hazard problems. 
Higher returns may be earned in the long run, but the President’s 
tenure may not coincide with the business cycle. Whether the 
creation of an international fund may contribute to smooth out 
the volatility of returns to reserves is an interesting issue outside 
the scope of this paper.  
The combination of extreme precaution, fear of corruption 
and agency issues may partially explain why monetary policy 
in less developed countries seems to be overly conservative to 
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the point of becoming either irrational or suboptimal. But the 
importance of all these factors should be assessed on a country 
by country basis.  In the case of Argentina, given its long history 
of corruption and sudden economic upheavals, a conservative 
policy may very well be optimal and rational.         
A crucial question then arises: Can, or will, the government 
deviate significantly from the current policy without increasing 
the risk of provoking more financial instability?
This paper argues that, according to the data presented, 
the answer is no. The cost of the policy is not negligible, but it is 
not clear at this point that reallocating these resources to other 
uses would yield greater payoffs to the country. A more aggressive 
redistribution policy may alleviate the pain of some parts of the 
population for a limited time but may expose the country to the 
eternal cycles of volatility and capital outflows, sudden stops, 
thereby defeating the policy’s main objective and setting the 
basis for greater levels of political risk. Additionally, without the 
proper complementary policies, fund transfers could amount to 
nothing more than dumping money and harvesting corruption 
and expectations of future transfers leading to greater political 
risk as the government is unable to meet expectations.     
One option is for the government to identify those pro-
grams that affect groups that pose a higher political risk. That 
may be amoral but it is rational and may lead to long term 
effects of greater inequality. By caving in to the demands of those 
groups that have greater political clout and stronger lobbies, the 
government may implement policies that could increase poverty 
and unemployment, thereby defeating it own agenda. Woo 
(2003) supports this view. On the other hand, by attempting to 
implement a program without, al least, enough support from the 
political establishment, it may promote enough political risk to 
bring the program to a standstill. 
revista de economía del caribe nº1 (2008) págs. 1-45 [37]
Luis F. Brunstein
This suggests that, once political risk is considered, the 
political feasibility of a program may play an important role 
in shaping the dynamics of it. In other words, the effect of the 
program on the socio-economic structure of the country endo-
genizes, among other things, the political risk. Implicitly, the 
policy-maker will be continuously searching for a set of policies 
that would minimize risk while simultaneously attempting to 
achieve multiple and linked objectives. However, this paper 
does not suggest that risk analysis should dominate industrial 
policy and its complementary policies, it rather suggests that risk 
analysis should complement policy formation in order to asses its 
feasibility, particularly in the long run or for a time horizon long 
enough for a set of policies to yield some tangible results. 
While the real world is a lot messier than clean theoretical 
statements, it seems clear that the government of Argentina, via 
a very complex web of subtle and dynamically adapting nego-
tiations with different groups in the country, has been doing 
precisely that.  It has attempted to keep the economic program 
alive while patching problems as they appear on the horizon. 
In this scenario risk control, or financial stability, has become a 
priority at every step of the way.  According to Martin Redrado, 
Chairman of the Argentine Central Bank, “monetary policy can 
not be defined by strict quantitative rules. Therefore, we must 
build structures to mitigate vulnerabilities in the face of adverse 
scenarios, before we try to delineate and follow an optimal path 
of uncertain outcome”.29  
29  Part of his address during the 2006 conference on monetary and banking 
policy held in Argentina during June 5 and 6.  The actual text in Spanish read: 
La política monetaria no puede aferrarse a reglas cuantitativas estrictas. Por 
lo tanto, debemos construir estructuras para mitigar vulnerabilidades frente a 
escenarios adversos, antes que pretender delinear y seguir un sendero óptimo 
de resultado incierto.
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Kaminsky (2005, pp. 21) argues that “…there is no optimal 
policy to deal with the risks of volatile international capital flows, 
as policies that may work in the short run may have adverse effects 
in the long run.” And Bernanke (2006) states that “…a robust 
approach to policymaking requires the use of multiple sources 
of information and multiple methods of analysis, combined with 
frequent reality checks.”
For instance, a patchy but relatively effective way to main-
tain inflation under control via coercion and constant negotiation 
has not acted as a total detractor for new investment and has had 
progressive distributive effects. The emission of government 
financial instruments to support its competitive currency may 
have had some effect on the expansion of credit via the upward 
pressure exerted on interest, but other measures had been 
implemented, lowering the requirement on collateral, for 
example, to foster credit at the same time. Of course, changes in 
collateral’s rules may in itself increase risk, but the balance sheets 
of the financial system seem to be solid enough at this point. In 
other words, prudential risk management, whether intended 
or accidental, seems to characterize current policy-making in 
Argentina.
Another example is a conflict between the Central Bank 
and the private banking system that sits precisely at the core of 
this paper’s argument. As explained above, the Central Bank has 
changed the norms on reserve requirements for different types 
of deposits, whereby preference was given to the longer term in 
an effort to foster liquidity and reduce fragility.  Simultaneously, 
the government is trying to extend mortgage credit to renters 
so they can become home owners. This would involve a system 
of subsidies so borrowers can obtain lower interest rates. But 
representatives from the banking sector have argued that the new 
reserve requirement structure prevents that from happening. 
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Hence, the dilemma between safety and expansionary fiscal 
policy arises once again at the center of the political discussion 
that directly affects the profit rates of the financial system, thus 
underscoring the need for a prudential risk management approach 
to policy.30 
All said, however, there has not been enough time to judge 
with some degree of fairness the ability of such an approach to the 
maintenance of stability. As understood here, given that political 
risk is taken into account, long run stability cannot be achieved 
if the fundamental social variables do not improve over time.  In 
the case of Argentina, the limited evidence suggests that, along 
with financial stability, political risk may loom as an important 
variable sometime into the future.
How long can the less favored groups wait before they 
act upon their frustrations? That is difficult to tell and, as argued 
earlier, it should not be a relevant question; it may actually be a 
self-defeating one. Instead, the government ought to, as it may 
have already, recognize that the welfare of the entire society must 
be taken into consideration when designing a set of policies that 
aspire to achieve long run objectives. This may be done by giving 
appropriate weights to the various sources of risk so that, in the 
process, the set of dynamically adaptive policies may be able to 
fluctuate about a range of motion such that risk or the perception 
of it is thereby minimized. Following previous arguments, the 
greater the degree of social exclusion and the longer it exists, 
the greater the weight that should be attached to the problem. 
Hence, the conclusions may be generalized to other countries 
but the weights may vary from one system to the next as social 
structures and histories differ.   
30  From Clarin.com, August 13, 2006, “Lanzan un plan con facilidades para 
impulsar los créditos hipotecarios.”
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In other words, the government of Argentina may need to 
implement a dynamic approach to policy-making by continuously 
adapting to the internal and external changes, while attempting 
to minimize the total risk so as to maximize its chances of 
achieving its various and simultaneous policy objectives. In 
the final analysis this may be the only real option available –the 
eclecticism embraced by the current administration– to be able to 
dismount themselves from the historical rollercoaster of political 
and economic eruptions upon which the people of Argentina rode 
for at least the last century. 
CONCLUSIONS
The main objective of this paper is to characterize the dilemma 
faced by many governments in developing countries when trying 
to maintain financial stability and simultaneously decrease poverty 
and increase employment before their policies lose credibility 
and, consequently, political support.  
By conceptualizing the problem as one where chronic 
levels of poverty and unemployment lead to political risk, the 
paper argues that such risk should  be part of the overall risk 
management approach. Hence, monetary and fiscal policies do 
not have to fall prey to stabilization goals, thereby inhibiting their 
ability to address social problems, but rather should be used to 
minimize financial and political risk.  
To illustrate the point the paper examines the current 
situation in Argentina. The government is implementing various 
stabilizing policies and attempting to shield the country against 
exogenous shocks and internal instability potentially arising from 
relatively high levels of unemployment and poverty. The data 
shows that the government is taking a sort of adaptive dynamic 
approach to policy formation, whereby economic and political 
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problems are constantly being addressed so as to minimize the 
total risk, financial plus political, to the economic system or 
to maximize economic stability. The approach is eclectic but 
consistent with the current literature on financial stability and 
political risk.   
Given that many threats to the region loom in the horizon 
it seems natural to extend this line of research to discuss to what 
extent emerging economies can survive significant exogenous 
shocks alone or if they should begin taking steps towards forming 
common financial markets, as the MERCOSUR countries are 
beginning to do, and how that would affect individual and regional 
risk. Some of the threats are the instability of the United Sates 
economy and the lack of regulation of financial flows, as was 
evident from the unwillingness of the SEC and the Courts in 
the United States to increase the control of hedge funds in the 
light of serious allegations of corruption.31 This is particularly 
important now because, as financial markets in developing 
countries become more complete, some of the new instruments 
may piggy bag with them hidden risks: the political effect that a 
change of power in Cuba may have on Latin America; the never 
ending conflict in the Middle East; impending conflicts between 
the United States and Iran and North Korea; the ongoing political 
situation in several countries in Africa; the failure of the WTO to 
reach stable agreements on tariffs and subsidies and the effect 
this will have on relative prices, employment and poverty in 
emerging economies. 
Thus, there is a need to evaluate alternative designs of 
international institutions that would regulate the flow of funds, 
31  From the New York Times online, June 23, 2006, “Ruling sets back effort to 
regulate hedge funds.”
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provide countercyclical relief and administer global funds to 
optimize returns. This should provide more than enough fuel 
for many new papers.     
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